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Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:54:28 -0800
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@...nbsd.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
keescook@...omium.org, jannh@...gle.com, sroettger@...gle.com,
willy@...radead.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, usama.anjum@...labora.com,
rdunlap@...radead.org, jorgelo@...omium.org, groeck@...omium.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, pedro.falcato@...il.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Introduce mseal
On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 8:05 PM Theo de Raadt <deraadt@...nbsd.org> wrote:
>
> Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> > To me, the most important thing is to deliver a feature that's easy to
> > use and works well. I don't want users to mess things up, so if I'm
> > the one giving them the tools, I'm going to make sure they have all
> > the information they need and that there are safeguards in place.
> >
> > e.g. considering the following user case:
> > 1> a security sensitive data is allocated from heap, using malloc,
> > from the software component A, and filled with information.
> > 2> software component B then uses mprotect to change it to RO, and
> > seal it using mseal().
>
> p = malloc(80);
> mprotect(p & ~4095, 4096, PROT_NONE);
> free(p);
>
> Will you save such a developer also? No.
>
> Since the same problem you describe already exists with mprotect() what
> does mseal() even have to do with your proposal?
>
> What about this?
>
> p = malloc(80);
> munmap(p & ~4095, 4096);
> free(p);
>
> And since it is not sealed, how about madvise operations on a proper
> non-malloc memory allocation? Well, the process smashes it's own
> memory. And why is it not sealed? You make it harder to seal memory!
>
> How about this?
>
> p = malloc(80);
> bzero(p, 100000;
>
> Yes it is a buffer overflow. But this is all the same class of software
> problem:
>
> Memory belongs to processes, which belongs to the program, which is coded
> by the programmer, who has to learn to be careful and handle the memory correctly.
>
> mseal() / mimmutable() add *no new expectation* to a careful programmer,
> because they expected to only use it on memory that they *promise will never
> be de-allocated or re-permissioned*.
>
> What you are proposing is not a "mitigation", it entirely cripples the
> proposed subsystem because you are afraid of it; because you have cloned a
> memory subsystem primitive you don't fully understand; and this is because
> you've not seen a complete operating system using it.
>
> When was the last time you developed outside of Chrome?
>
> This is systems programming. The kernel supports all the programs, not
> just the one holy program from god.
>
Even without free.
I personally do not like the heap getting sealed like that.
Component A.
p=malloc(4096);
writing something to p.
Component B:
mprotect(p,4096, RO)
mseal(p,4096)
This will split the heap VMA, and prevent the heap from shrinking, if
this is in a frequent code path, then it might hurt the process's
memory usage.
The existing code is more likely to use malloc than mmap(), so it is
easier for dev to seal a piece of data belonging to another component.
I hope this pattern is not wide-spreading.
The ideal way will be just changing the library A to use mmap.
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