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Date: Tue,  9 Jan 2024 13:14:37 +0100
From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>
To: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
	Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
	Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...nel.org>,
	"Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	x86@...nel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org,
	steven.price@....com,
	Phong Tran <tranmanphong@...il.com>,
	mark.rutland@....com,
	Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] powerpc,s390: Define ptdump_check_wx() regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_WX

Following patch will use ptdump_check_wx() regardless of
CONFIG_DEBUG_WX, so define it at all times of powerpc and s390
just like other architectures. Though keep the WARN_ON_ONCE()
only when CONFIG_DEBUG_WX is set.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>
---
 arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c | 7 +++----
 arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c  | 7 ++-----
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c
index 620d4917ebe8..b835c80371cd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/ptdump/ptdump.c
@@ -184,13 +184,14 @@ static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	pte_t pte = __pte(st->current_flags);
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_WX) || !st->check_wx)
+	if (!st->check_wx)
 		return;
 
 	if (!pte_write(pte) || !pte_exec(pte))
 		return;
 
-	WARN_ONCE(1, "powerpc/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
+	WARN_ONCE(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_WX),
+		  "powerpc/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
 		  (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
 
 	st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
@@ -326,7 +327,6 @@ static void __init build_pgtable_complete_mask(void)
 				pg_level[i].mask |= pg_level[i].flag[j].mask;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
 void ptdump_check_wx(void)
 {
 	struct pg_state st = {
@@ -354,7 +354,6 @@ void ptdump_check_wx(void)
 	else
 		pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found\n");
 }
-#endif
 
 static int __init ptdump_init(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index 8dcb4e0c71bd..99da5a5602a8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ static void print_prot(struct seq_file *m, unsigned int pr, int level)
 
 static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
 	if (!st->check_wx)
 		return;
 	if (st->current_prot & _PAGE_INVALID)
@@ -138,10 +137,10 @@ static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
 	 */
 	if (addr == PAGE_SIZE && (nospec_uses_trampoline() || !static_key_enabled(&cpu_has_bear)))
 		return;
-	WARN_ONCE(1, "s390/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %pS\n",
+	WARN_ONCE(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_WX),
+		  "s390/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %pS\n",
 		  (void *)st->start_address);
 	st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_WX */
 }
 
 static void note_page(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, int level, u64 val)
@@ -193,7 +192,6 @@ static void note_page(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, int level,
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
 void ptdump_check_wx(void)
 {
 	struct pg_state st = {
@@ -226,7 +224,6 @@ void ptdump_check_wx(void)
 			(nospec_uses_trampoline() || !static_key_enabled(&cpu_has_bear)) ?
 			"unexpected " : "");
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_WX */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS
 static int ptdump_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
-- 
2.41.0


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