linux-ext4 - Re: [PATCH v2] fs/{posix_acl,ext2,jfs,ceph}: apply umask if ACL support is disabled

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 10 Oct 2023 15:17:17 +0200
From:   Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@...os.com>
To:     Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Cc:     Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com>, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
        Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@...nel.org>, ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
        jfs-discussion@...ts.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fs/{posix_acl,ext2,jfs,ceph}: apply umask if ACL
 support is disabled

On Tue, Oct 10, 2023 at 3:11 PM Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz> wrote:
> Thanks for the updated changelog! But as I'm looking into VFS code isn't
> this already handled by mode_strip_umask() / vfs_prepare_mode() in
> fs/namei.c? Because posix_acl_create() doesn't do anything to 'mode' for
> !IS_POSIXACL() filesystems either. So at least ext2 (where I've checked
> the mount option handling) does seem to have umask properly applied in all
> the cases. But I might be missing something...

I'm not sure either. I was hoping the VFS experts could tell something
about how this API is supposed to be used and whose responsibility it
is to apply the umask. There used to be some confusion in the code, to
the point it was missing completely for O_TMPFILE. I'm still somewhat
confused. Maybe this is a chance to clear this confusion up and then
document it?

I wish there was one central place to apply the umask, and not spread
it around two (or more?) different code locations, depending on
whether there's an ACL. For my taste, that sort of policy is too error
prone for something as sensitive as umasks. After we already had the
O_TMPFILE vulnerability (which was only fixed last year, three
years(!) after I reported it).