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Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2008 05:49:42 +1200
From: pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: dave.korn@...imi.com, ekr@...workresonance.com
Cc: benl@...gle.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
cryptography@...zdowd.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
general@...nid.net, security@...nid.net
Subject: Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
Eric Rescorla <ekr@...workresonance.com> writes:
>It's easy to compute all the public keys that will be generated
>by the broken PRNG. The clients could embed that list and refuse
>to accept any certificate containing one of them. So, this
>is distinct from CRLs in that it doesn't require knowing
>which servers have which cert...
You'd also end up with a rather large list for the client to carry around,
which would be especially problematic for lightweight clients. You'd need to
represent it as something like a Bloom filter to avoid this (given that most
users will just click OK on invalid certs, the small false positive rate
shouldn't have much effect either :-).
Peter.
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